My friend Steve is one of the
best investment barometers
I know. He’s smart, confident,
and always on top of the latest
investment news. If something’s
hot, Steve is buying. And if something’s
not, Steve is dumping.
In 2005, Steve bought into the
supremely hot U.S. real estate
market. In 2007, he joined my
investment club after we gained
17% for the calendar year. In
2011, he was buying gold.
He sold his American
condo in 2009
when it lost value; he
relinquished his
investment club
membership in 2008
when our portfolio
got hammered; and
now he’s thinking
about selling his gold
at a loss.
In each case, he
bought what was rising
after it rose, and sold what
fell, after it dropped. That’s why
Steve’s my investment barometer.
If he’s buying something,
it probably isn’t a good idea to
follow suit. He buys recent winners,
and it costs him plenty.
Steve’s behaviour is pretty common.
Too many investors, unfortunately,
look backward. They
feel comfortable putting their
money on yesterday’s front-runners,
hoping (even expecting)
they’ll continue their frantic pace.
But most of the time, choosing
investments based on how they’ve
done in the recent past is a recipe
for mediocrity—or worse.
We’re often attracted to hot
currencies, sizzling commodities,
mutual fund scorchers or
sky-rocketing stocks. Neurosurgeon
and investment author William
Bernstein suggests that the
part of our brains called the amygdala
comforts us when we’re
buying yesterday’s winners. We
like looking for established patterns
because they served our
ancestors well. As Bernstein
explains, “A hundred thousand
years ago, if seeing a flash of yellow
and black stripes in your
peripheral vision was followed
by the gruesome death of one of
your companions, you do well
to associate those two events.”
But finance is statistically
far less predictable
than the behaviour
of hungry tigers.
John Bogle, the
founder of the Vanguard
Group, explains
this weakness in
action when examining
investors’ mutual
fund returns. The
average U.S. mutual
fund from 1980 to
2005 gained 10% per year. But
the average investor in those
funds made only 7.3%—giving
up more than one third of their
potential earnings each year.
Those mischievous amygdalae
convinced people to add more
money to funds that were winning,
while selling (or not adding
fresh money to) the funds that
weren’t performing. They tried
creating patterns where they
didn’t exist, expecting a winning
fund to keep winning and
a losing fund to keep losing. Fear
of low prices prevented investors
from buying when their
funds were low, and elation at
high prices encouraged people
to chase funds when the prices
were higher.
Most of us, unfortunately,
respond similarly to market stimuli.
We react first and rationalize
later. Even investment professionals
can slip on their own bars
of soap. Examining the flagship
Canadian balanced funds from
the Big Five banks paints an interesting
picture. Most of them hold
roughly 40% Canadian bonds
and 60% Canadian stocks. During
the past decade, stocks mostly
surged (2003–2007), interrupted
by the occasional dramatic collapse
(2002, 2008). Did the fund
managers fall into the psychological
trap of chasing stocks
when they soared, and abandoning
them to chase bonds when
stocks fell? I think they did.
During the 10 years from
December 2001 to December
2011, the balanced funds from
Canada’s big banks (TD Balanced
Growth; CIBC Balanced; BMO/
NB Balanced; Scotia Canadian
Balanced; and RBC Balanced
Fund) were each whipped by an
equally weighted portfolio comprised
of TD’s e-Series Canadian
stock index and TD’s e-Series
Canadian bond index.
You might point to the higher
fee structure of the actively managed
bank funds as the culprit
in their underperformance, but
there’s more to it. If we discount
the higher fees, those funds still
fell short of their dispassionately
indexed counterpart.
Perhaps you’re wondering if
the actively managed mutual
funds held foreign stocks, which—during the past decade—underperformed
the Canadian stock
market. If that were the case,
they don’t hold them anymore.
Foreign exposure, if any, accounts
for less than 4% of the total for
each respective fund.
Did the fund managers shun
bank stocks while they were falling
in 2008, only to stockpile
them in 2009 and 2010 as they
grew more expensive? Maybe.
Or did they chase rising bonds
or rising stocks when they should
have been doing the opposite?
Again, it’s entirely possible. The
bottom line is that they underperformed.
Even the professionals
chase past winners.
But you don’t have to repeat
their mistakes. Try owning a
diversified, international collection
of quality stocks or broad
market indexes, in conjunction
with a bond component. Maintain
your desired allocation,
adjusting once a year when soaring
or falling markets cause your
allocation to shift from the
desired split.
You may want to use your age
as a benchmark for the percentage
of bonds you’ll have in your
portfolio. If, for example, you’re
40 years old, you may want about
40% of your portfolio comprised
of bonds, with the remainder in
stocks or stock indexes.
The most important part is
this: if you’re adding fresh money
to your investments each month,
and a specific stock or index that
you own is rising in price, don’t
add to it. Keep the allocation you
started with by adding to bonds
when your stocks rise, or adding
to stocks when bonds rise. Control
your primitive reactions.
Sure, somebody you know is
going to make a killing by bandwagoning
on a hot stock or sector—perhaps by picking yesterday’s
winner. But investing is a
marathon, not a sprint.
Look at last year’s winners if
you must. But don’t buy anything
based solely on past performance.
The biggest investment enemy,
after all, is the one we face in the
mirror each day.
Hey—just ask my buddy Steve
about that.
Andrew Hallam is the author of Millionaire Teacher: The Nine Rules of Wealth You Should Have Learned In School.